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CROSS-CURRENTS IN THE WISCONSIN
CHARITY DOCTRINE
CARL ZOLLMANN*
The Anglo-Saxon history of the Charity Doctrine is a prom-
inent example of the working out of legal results partly through
the co-operation of the judicial and the legislative departments
and partly by their opposition to each other. The very statute
of Elizabeth was a remedial measure designed to furnish a
quicker and more certain relief than the courts at that time had
devised. Its very title was: "An Act to redress the mis-employ-
ment of certain lands, goods and stocks of money heretofore
given to certain charitable uses."' Its plain object was to place
in the hands of a commission a troublesome branch of the royal
prerogative subject only to the revising power of the Lord Chan-
cellor.. In other words its purpose was to create a commission to
deal with the situation, but to make the commission subordinate
to the Lord Chancellor. This legislative intention, however, was
thwarted by the Courts. The power given to the Lord Chancellor
though secondary and appellate was in fact absolute and final
and soon swallowed up its parent and became original and abso-
lute. By judicial legislation, that which parliament had intended
as the principal object of the statute was completely submerged
and superseded. All that remained effective was the enumera-
tion of the various charitable uses in the preamble of the statute
which were intended merely as an enumeration.
Turning to America, we find a similar situation. In 1827-28,
two decades before Wisconsin became a state, New York en-
acted the first real revision of its statutes. In this revision it
sought to codify the law of trusts and abolished at the same
time all uses and trusts "except as authorized and modified in
this article."' There clearly was no intention to effect the law
of charities. Due to the primeval conditions still prevailing in
the state this subject was not in the minds of the legislature at
all. The chancellor, therefore, was startled in 1844 when the
contention was made that this statute had abolished charitable
uses and pointed out clearly that the ends which the statute
'43, Elivabeth, chapter 4.
2 1 Revised Statutes of New York-i829, page 727.
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sought to remedy were not incident to charitable trusts, that its
provisions were inapplicable to the administration of charities,
and that the purpose of the statute was merely to cut down
those intricacies and refinements in the dealings of individuals
with real estate which had perplexed conveyances and filled the
courts with litigation.3
Five years later in 1849 Wisconsin adopted this statute4 and,
on ordinary principles, adopted with it the construction which
had theretofore been placed upon it. It is true that this con-
struction was not by the highest court. This, however, should
not have affected the situation because the New York Court of
Appeals in 1853 adopted the construction placed upon the stat-
ute in 1844.5
However, the question did not come before the Wisconsin
Supreme Court until 1876 after the New York Appellate Court
in the meantime had overruled its former decision and had held
that the statute in fact had abolished all uses and trusts includ-
ing charitable trusts.6 The court, therefore, was confronted with
a choice between the construction of the statute at the time it
was adopted by Wisconsin and its subsequent construction.
Luther S. Dixon, its eminent chief justice for fifteen years,
had resigned his office in 1874 and contended ably and earnestly
for the former construction. His successor, Chief Justice Ryan,
unfortunately, had been retained in the case before he went to
the bench, and hence was disqualified to sit. This threw the re-
sponsibility of making a choice on Lyon J. and Cole J., his only
associates. The result was that Dixon's correct contention was
overruled and that Wisconsin for the time being was committed
to the New York heresy that charitable trusts had been abolished
by the statute so far, at least, as real estate is concerned.7
At the same time another case involving a gift for the benefit
of "the Roman Catholic orphans of the diocese of La Crosse"
was disposed of by the court. The holding was that such a gift
was invalid for indefiniteness, the court saying:' "How is it
3 z844, Shotwell vs. Abbott-2 Sandf. Ch. 46, 51 (N. Y.).
'Revised Stats. of Wis., 1849. Chap. 57. The present section is 2o7I.1853, Williams vs. Willialms, 8 N. Y. (4 Seld.) 525.
'For discussion of process by which this result was arrived at see
author's book American Law of Charities. Sects. 5i to 53 - 1w being pub-
lished by Bruce Publishing Company, Milwaukee. See also article by
author in Vol. i Wis. Law Review, page 129, entitled "The Development of
Charity Doctrine in Wis."
7876 Ruth vs. Oberbrunner, 40 Wis. 238.
a 1876 Heiss vs. Murphy, 4o Wis. 290, 291.
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possible to ascertain and determine what orphans were intended
to be benefitted? Are they whole orphans or half orphans?
Are they orphans of parents both of whom were members of the
Roman Catholic Church, or will an orphan of a Roman Catholic
father, or of a Roman Catholic mother, come within the desig-
nated class? Are the objects of this charity the full orphans or
half orphans who were living within the diocese at the death of
the testator, or will such of either class as may thereafter come
into the diocese be entitled fo take as beneficiaries? Again,
upon what principle or in what manner is the fund created by the
sale of the real estate to be expended? Is the executor or trustee
to apportion it equally among the orphans of the diocese, when
it is ascertained who are entitled to take, or is he to dispense it in
his discretion for the benefit of such orphans as he may select
from time to time? These questions suggest the perplexities and
difficulties which the court must encounter in establishing and
carrying into effect this trust. It seems to us they are insuper-
able."
In strict accordance with this decision the court in 1888 de-
clared a gift direct "to the poor of the city of Green Bay" void
because the testator had not designated whether he intended
paupers or poor persons who h/d not as yet become paupers.9 In
these cases the gift was in form direct to the beneficiaries in-
stead of going to them through a trustee. In 1897, however, the
court held a gift to the deacons of a designated church for the
American Baptist Publication Society "to aid in the support of
a Baptist colporteur and missionary in the State of Wisconsin"
to be void for indefiniteness and said: "Whether the colporteur
or missionary should labor throughout the entire state, and
sell or give away the religious books and publications, or whether
they should expend their efforts among the colored or white
population, or both; whether with the destitute or wealthy; and
what publications they should distribute-all are matters left in
doubt and uncertainty." 10
This was not, however, the only line of decisions in Wisconsin
prior to 19oo. In 1879 the case of Dodge vs. Williams"' came
before the court. Chief Justice Ryan was now able to partici-
1888 Estate of Hoffen, 70 Wis. 522, 36 N. W. 304.
1890 Will of Fuller, 75 Wis. 431, 437, 44 N. W. 304. See also 1897
McHugh vs. McCole, 97 Wis. 166, 72 N. W. 631.
"146 Wis. 7o, 95, 5o N. W. 1o3, i N. W. 92.
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pate in the decision and threw his great influence, penetrating
judgment and prophetic foresight into the judicial scales. The
consequence- was an opinion written by Ryan and concurred in
by the entire court which distinguished Ruth vs. Oberbrunner
decided three years before by applying to the case the doctrine
of equitable conversion and by fiat of law changing the property
from real tb personal and thus making the trust statute inap-
plicable to it. It was this decision and particularly the reasoning
of the court which was instrumental in producing another line
of decisions dealing with the question of the necessary definite-
ness. Hence, the court in 1886 upheld a gift to a church for the
relief of the resident poor of a town as being sufficiently defi-
nite and certain.1 2 In 1897 a donation for the support, main-
tenance, education and aid of such indigent orphan children un-
der the age of fourteen years in Rock County as to the executors
may appear to be most needy and deserving was sustained."
A similar decision was made the same year in a case arising in
Watertown in which a gift to that city for the aged and poor
was upheld.' 4
These two lines of decisions are as clearly inconsistent as are
darkness and light. They were completely before the court in
the great and leading case of Harrington vs. Pier'5 The first
line of decisions was in express terms overruled and Marshal
J. laid down that "Indefiniteness of beneficiaries who can in-
voke judicial authority to enforce the trust, want of a trustee if
there be a trust in fact, or indefiniteness in details of the par-
ticulr purposes declared, the general limits being reasonably
ascertainable or indefiniteness of mode of carrying out the par-
ticular purpose, does not militate against the validity of a trust
for charitable uses.""-' In accordance with this decision gifts
for the benefit of such "indigent sick persons residing in the
city of Milwaukee as my said trustees in their wise discretion
shall deem worthy of such aid and assistance" '6 and for "the
support and maintenance of the superannuated preachers of the
church denominated the United Brethren in Christ" '1 have been
=1886 Webster vs. Morris, 66 Wis. 366, 384, 57 Am. Rep. 278, 28 N. W.
353.
11897 Sawtelle vs. Witham, 94 Wis. 412, 69 N. W. 72.
1 1897 Beurhaus vs. Cole, 94 Wis. 617, 630, 69 N. W. 986.
105 Wis. 485, 514, 76 Am. ST. Rep. 924, So L. A. R. 307, 82 N. W. 345.
"192o it re Keenan, Wis. 176 N. W. 857.
1719oo Hood vs. Dorer, io7 Wis. 149, 82 N. W. 546.
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upheld in cases subsequently decided. In 1904 the court ap-
proved expressly of Harrington vs. Pier and stated that "if
any specific use, clearly charitable, is excluded from the field of
expenditure limited by the will, then to a demonstration the
donation is not to charity generally, and without limit and does
not fail of the definiteness required for its support." "8 One
source of exasperation at the decisions of the court thus ap-
peared to have been eliminated.
Unfortunately this appearance is deceiving. On October i6,
1923, the court handed down its decision in the case of Tharp vs.
Smith. 9 The testator in this case had given all his residuary
estate to a designated and competent trustee who was willing to
act for the benefit of the Seventh Day Adventist Church to be
used principally for the publication and distribution of tracts
and literature teaching its doctrine. The testator had not been
a member of that church and there was no local branch of it in
the very city of his residence. The court by Vinje C. J. (Esch-
weiler J. dissenting) held this gift to be void for indefiniteness
stating that it was impossible to designate with any degree of
reasonable -certainty what Seventh Day Adventist Church, local
or general, incorporated or unincorporated, was intended and that
neither the trustee nor the court could with reasonable certainty
determine who the proper trustees or the proper church organiza-
tion might be.
It is interesting to note the cases which the court cites in sup-
port of its decision. It cites Heiss vs. Murphy and Will of Fuller,
heretofore referred to in this article as having been overruled by
Harrington vs. Pier. There can be no question but what these
two overruled cases support the decision of the court. The court,
however, is not satisfied to cite these two cases but cites Harring-
ton vs. Pier as well, though that great case clearly and decisively
takes exactly the opposite view. Just what induced the- court
to do this is beyond the author's knowledge. If it were intended
to overrule Pier vs. Harrington it certainly would have been bet-
ter to have done so in direct terms. Nothing certainly is gained
by citing a case which negatives a proposition in affirmance of it.
Little need be added to what already has been said. The court
in Tharp vs. Smith very clearly overlooks the patent fact that a
certain amount of discretion is inherently vested in every trustee
"19o4 Kronshage vs. Varrell, 120 Wis. 161, 97 N. W. 928.
"195 N. W. 33.-Wis.-.
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and even confuses this discretion with the Cy Pres doctrine which
is declared not to be in force in this state.20  It gathers to its
breast an old error which Marshall had exposed clearly in his
opinions and revitalizes it. It is to be hoped that the legislature
will soon take the necessary action to correct the error thus pro-
pounded by the court.
'For a detailed discussion of the Cy Pres doctrine and of the discretion
vested in the trustee the reader is referred to the author's American Law
of Charity now in course of publication.
